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All countries agree that Holders of Public Office are role models, should exercise ethical 
leadership and accept highest ethical requirements. If countries want these standards and 
requirements to be effective, they must invest in the institutionalisation, implementation, 
monitoring and enforcement of ethics policies. 
In the field of Conflicts of Interests (CoI), countries continue to introduce ever more and 
ever stricter standards and requirements. They also invest ever more resources in the 
institutionalization of CoI policies. Because of the sophisticated nature of these policies, 
the effective implementation remains a challenge. This article explains the lack of 
effectiveness, drawing on longitudinal insights derived from two studies conducted by the 
authors in 2007 and 2020.  We rely on data generated in an expert survey with public 
officials from 18 EU Member States. Our results show that countries regulate ever more 
CoI issues, broaden CoI concepts and introduce tougher behavioural standards, shifting 
the focus towards an individualised “bad person” logic instead of systemic or institutional 
approaches. If CoI scandals emerge, the focus is almost always on individual 
misbehaviour. Although Member States invest more in the implementation of CoI policies, 
they shy away from enforcing policies and rules against ministers. As such, policies become 
more complex, the institutionalisation of CoI policies more professional (yet also more 
fragmented) and the management of CoI ever more resource intensive. Overall, formalism, 
administrative burdens and the politicization of CoI policies are increasing. As such, we 
conclude that CoI policies have not become more effective. 
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(Paper presented at the EGPA Conference in Brussels, September 2021) 
How effective are the Conflicts of Interest (CoI) policies in the EU Member States? Also, 
how can the effectiveness of these policies be measured? In the field of Conflicts of 
Interests (CoI), countries continue to introduce ever more and ever stricter standards and 
requirements. They also invest ever more resources in the institutionalization of CoI 
policies. Because of the sophisticated nature of these policies, the effective implementation 
remains a challenge. 
This article explains the lack of effectiveness, drawing on longitudinal insights derived 
from two studies conducted by the authors in 2007 and 2020. Public policies can only be 
effective if they are supported by political processes that support these policies from the 
design of the policy (or instrument) to its implementation and enforcement. In the field of 
ethics, for a long time, the focus has been on the adoption of new ethics policies, but not 
on the implementation and enforcement (Demmke and Moilanen 2012, 55; Demmke et 
al., 2021). 
During the last decades, the political climate seemed to become more favourable for ethics 
politics. Ethics policies have not only become more popular. Instead, politicians have also 
discovered that moral action helps them to gain political support, for example by using 
anti-corruption agendas as a political weapon against political opponents. Countries have 
also started to invest in new value-based integrity policies, ethics infrastructures and the 
management of ethics policies in order to compensate for the integrity gaps that previous 
governance and managerial logics produced. Anecharico and Jacobs (1996) define this as 
the birth of a “panoptic vision” of integrity policies. “They have gone beyond the political, 
legal, and institutional legacies of their predecessors (…). The contemporary reformers 
adopt or invent technologies, institutions, and routines to monitor public employees 
closely” (Anecharico and Jacobs 1996, 23). 
In the meantime, all countries find themselves in a process of institutionalisation of ethics 
policies (Hoekstra and Kaptein 2012; Hoekstra/Zweegers, 2021) and address the question 
of how ethics policies can be professionalized and thoroughly secured, anchored, 
embedded or safeguarded within the organization. 
On the other hand, despite claims about the positive effects of Good Governance and the 
institutionalization of ethics policies, today, also in western countries, almost all recent 
governance indexes show worrying trends in the fields of democracy, justice, human 
rights, rule of law, corruption, politicization, inequality, and the freedom of the press. 
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Thus, if current trends towards democratic backsliding (on the one hand) and the rise of 
populism (on the other hand) continue in most countries, this may necessarily have a 
critical impact on the (in- ) effectiveness of integrity policies (Johnson and Fritzen (2021). 
Moreover, efforts in monitoring, enforcing and evaluating (the effectiveness of) ethics 
policies remains a tremendously difficult task. Despite a growing interest in the subject, 
there is almost no attention to the increasing administrative and bureaucratic challenges 
in monitoring revolving door and disclosure policies. Also, from a more theoretical point 
of view, evaluating the effectiveness of Conflict of Interest (CoI) policies faces many 
obstacles. Whereas efficient policies can be measured as regards a balanced ration between 
input, output and outcomes, the term effectiveness is also about offering better solutions 
and reaching governance objectives and standards. As such, effectiveness can be 
understood as the degree to which public authorities are successful in preventing and 
reducing CoI. However, in this study, our definition of effectiveness allows for a more 
multidimensional analysis of effects of governance policies. As such, we start with the 
assumption that ethics policies rarely have only positive effects, but they always also have 
negative, mostly unintentional side-effects, such as more bureaucracy, higher costs, more 
intrusion into privacy and moral instruments for political purposes. Next, effects of ethics 
policies also depend on many other variables such as good working conditions, ethical 
leadership and perceptions of organisational fairness. Therefore, we follow the approach, 
as discussed by Hesse et al. (2003) who have presented a useful matrix to assess various 
parallel positive, negative, intentional and unintentional effects of reforms. Applying this 
analytical concept to the field of ethics may help to engage in a meaningful debate about 
the effectiveness of ethics policies. However, in the field of ethics management, there exists 
very few methodological approaches that actually define effective ethics policies. Most 
promising is a framework that has been developed by Hoekstra et al. (2021). The authors 
discuss the quality of ethics systems according to a number of indicators and the (non) 
existence of preconditions for effective ethics policies:   
1. Attention/ agenda setting: attention to integrity at all levels of the organization, 
integrated with the personnel policy, communicated externally and provided with 
sufficient resources.  
2. Clarity/ specification: the integrity concept and policy are clearly defined, (socially) 
motivated and coherently operationalized.  
3. Ethical leadership: the management itself sets a good example, is open to 
employees and supports and enforces the integrity policy.  
4. Balanced strategy/ balancing: attention to a balanced and coherent integrity 
strategy that is both value- oriented (training and moral awareness) and rule- 
oriented (rules, supervision and sanctions).  
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5. Organize the presence of integrity measures and instruments, such as: code of 
conduct, specific regulations, reporting procedure, integration in personnel policy, 
training, confidential adviser, reporting point, investigation protocol, registration 
and reporting, risk analysis, integrity bureau or officer.  
6. Critical reflection and evaluation: periodic monitoring and evaluation of policy and 
system in terms of implementation and operation, learning from it, and external 
accountability.  
Amongst scholars, there is little doubt that these elements are essential requirements for 
any effective ethics policy and ethics management. However, from a theoretical point of 
view, it is still difficult to explain why some countries with relatively high integrity levels 
exist (such as Germany or Luxemburg) show little interest in the concept of integrated 
ethics infrastructures and ethics management and – instead - focus in their approaches on 
anti-corruption and anti-discrimination policies, rules, compliance and training (the so- 
called compliance- based countries). So far, experts have failed to explain why these 
countries show relatively little appetite in introducing complex ethics management 
systems, intentionally shy away from value based approaches and – nonetheless – provide 
for relative integer political- and administrative systems.  
This paper takes a first step into this direction.  
As we will show in this paper, many EU Member States perceive the management of CoI 
as an increasingly complex issue. However, countries also admit that, often, CoI of 
ministers are tolerated and not enforced. Overall, the EU Member States struggle to handle 
CoI despite their own increased political, regulatory and institutional efforts throughout 
the past decades. Therefore, we argue that Member States do too much and too little at the 
same time. On the one hand, they introduce ever more rules, tougher standards and invest 
in the institutionalisation of ethics policies (European Parliament 2020), however, thereby 
just increasing the complexity and making it harder to monitor and enforce compliance. 
On the other hand, Member States neglect the schism between higher complexity and the 
lack of effectiveness of ethics policies.   
The article presents empirical findings from a comparative study (European Parliament 
2020) for the European Parliament which was carried out in the year 2020. By conducting 
exhaustive empirical research on the ethics systems of 18 EU Member States, in-depth 
insight in an extremely complex and politically very sensitive subject could be gained. 
Because of its longitudinal approach, for the first time, we are also in the position to 
measure the development of CoI policies over time. Still, despite this, more empirical 
research is needed in a field that is characterised by highly intransparent and opaque 
structures and policies.  
University of Vaasa Reports     4 
In the following sections, we first assess the literature on CoI and the effectiveness of policy 
instruments in the field of CoI.  As a concept, Conflict of Interest has expanded to include 
ever more areas of life, such as loyalty conflicts and non-financial CoI of spouses. This in 
turn makes it harder to monitor CoI effectively.  
Second, we explain our methodological approach and why studying Conflict of Interest of 
Ministers is an important theme. Until now, there exists no empirical research on 
ministers. This is remarkable, as ministers exercise important positions of power and 
influence and their tasks differ from any other group of office holder or staff in general. In 
our survey, we operationalised CoI using a list of 15 different CoI. Because we wanted to 
provide a longitudinal analysis regarding EU Member State ethics frameworks, we 
followed a similar method used in an earlier comparative study in 2007. Moreover, our 
survey data was analysed with data from other surveys.  
Third, we introduce our survey results showing that the EU Member States have shifted 
their attention from a combination of compliance and value-based approaches to new 
strategies including behavioural approaches. In a time of more rules and stricter 
standards, it is difficult to sanction individual breaches of CoI. Regarding oversight and 
control, the situation is highly fragmented and decentralized. Concerning longitudinal 
analysis, every CoI issue has a higher policy coverage density than a decade ago. In most 
important forms of CoI, the law is still the predominant form of regulation. Interestingly, 
more than 30% of national responses considered "political reluctance to sanction" to be 
one of the biggest challenges in fighting CoI. We note a positive relationship between 
Government Integrity and the unacceptability of corruption, confirming the hypothesis 
that Good Governance and "ethics pay off". However, CoI are notoriously hard to measure, 
making it hard to gather evidence about the effectiveness of CoI policies. Moreover, ever 
more new rules may even decrease public trust. Our data do not suggest a negative effect 
of higher policy coverage density on trust, but neither a positive effect. Overall, we question 
whether the objective of increasing trust by implementing more policies and rules can de 
facto be achieved.  
1.1 Towards a theoretical understanding of the concept of 
(in)effective ethics and CoI Policies 
As we will see later, so far, no country is actively monitoring the development of CoI, nor 
whether the policies introduced, achieved the objectives. Therefore, to start with, it is 
difficult to know whether certain CoI policies are effective, or not and what are the costs 
and benefits of conflicts of interest laws (Rosenson 2006). Still, this does not mean that 
there exist no promising developments in the field. International evaluations use a variety 
of sources to assess and compare public integrity, such as expert assessments, surveys of 
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citizens, risk assessments, and data on legal proceedings, sanctions and fines (Lamboo et 
al. 2015). However, many relations remain unclear: Registered misconduct typically 
increases as ethical standards are being raised. More infringements will be recognized as 
misconduct when tolerance for misconduct decreases. Furthermore, there may be 
feedback loops within the model. Reducing misconduct may improve the ethical climate, 
which in turn influences the attitudes and behaviour of employees resulting in lower 
tolerance of misconduct and recognition of previously unnoticed minor infractions. Inside 
the field of conflicts of interest, discussions about the pros and cons of the right choice of 
instruments have only started. So far, it seems, the increasing interest in CoI policies has 
not necessarily produced more clarity and consensus on the effectiveness of CoI 
instruments in different contexts, the right choice of policy instruments within the best-fit 
organizational design of ethics infrastructures and the question of what types of incentives, 
rewards or penalties work best in which situation. For example, whilst some experts call 
for the need for more behavioural approaches and more “nudging” in the field of ethics, 
others believe that there is too little control and monitoring. Again, others point to the 
need for more intrinsic incentives and warn against a too strong focus on compliance 
approaches. Again, others are sceptic as to the effectiveness of value-based approaches and 
soft-instruments. Solid evidence only exists to the importance of the overall ethical climate 
of organizations, organisational justice and the importance of ethical leadership.  
Overall, research regarding ethics management and institutional integrity is progressing 
(Schwartz et al. 2015; Kirby 2020: Demmke 2020). According to Breaky, Cadman and 
Sampford (2015, 3), Sampford was the first academic to distinguish between institutional 
and individual integrity. Since then, Hoekstra and Kaptein became the leading experts in 
the field of institutionalising (public service) ethics. Also related to the issue of institutional 
integrity, Cropanzano and Folger (1991) were the first to invent the term of organizational 
justice and Linda Trevino the concepts of unethical behavior in the workplace and ethical 
culture (Trevino 1986). In the private sector, the concept of managerial ethics was founded 
by Schminke (1998). The notion of integrity systems seems to originate in the works by 
Pope, the founder of Transparency International (Pope 1996). Related concepts focused 
on the term of ethics integrity (Polowcyk 2017) or ethics infrastructure (such as those 
published by the OECD 2020) As regards the latter, the most important distinction 
between integrity systems (Huberts et al. 2012) and ethics infrastructures seems to be that 
the former is a more technical concept and the latter relies on a discussion of much broader 
variables such as the importance of the rule of law, democracy and the judiciary 
(Fernandez and Camacho 2016; Martin and KishGephart 2014). Finally, according to the 
OECD (Maesschalck and Bertok, 2009) the concept of integrity management can be 
defined as the activities undertaken to stimulate and enforce integrity and prevent 
corruption and other integrity violations within a particular organization. Integrity 
management is then the sum of systematic and integrated efforts to promote integrity 
within public-sector organizations (Kaptein 1998).  
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From a comparative point of view, at present, several reform trajectories exist which lead 
to innovations in the field of institutionalizing ethics management, but these highlight the 
existence of alternative models rather than a shift towards one common institutional 
reform model in the field of integrity. As such, the search for a best-practice ethics 
infrastructure is confronted with a context and institution-based, fragmented-, situational 
and pragmatic reality. Overall, institutional differences – notably the levels of budgetary 
resources, social legitimacy, work systems, leadership styles, education and training 
systems, work organisation and the collective organisation of employers and employees – 
mediate the impact of converging processes. Consequently, the proposition for 
implementing institutional and organisational models such as best-practice ethics 
management systems is ambiguous. The political and institutional world is currently 
moving away from universal best-practice institutional configurations towards more 
specific best-fit and individualized context-related models. New developments lean more 
towards the testing of new organisational models that fit into the national, regional, local 
or even into the specific organisational and leader-follower context. Best fit schools are 
associated with this contingency approach and argue that organisations must adapt their 
strategies and implement reforms to the specific local strategy and its environment. In 
most countries, the effectiveness of any particular institutional integrity system is also 
determined by the way it fits into the specific organisational culture. Consequently, also 
the choice of policy instruments is seen as a pluralist, nondeterministic and multipurpose 
approach that allows the application of a wide menu of instruments that address the 
specific individual, organizational and systemic causes for unethical behavior (Ewert 
2020).  
Compared to these many innovative trends in the field of ethics policies and ethics 
management, there is still standstill as regards the adoption of innovative approaches as 
regards the effectiveness of ethics policies. Most countries have not even started to monitor 
CoI, nor implemented cost-benefit analysis of CoI policies, nor reduced administrative 
burdens or suggested solutions to increasing legal-and organisational fragmentation. In 
almost all countries, there is also no consensus regarding the mechanism by which 
instrument might impact output and outcomes. In which situation, in which sector and as 
regards which instrument is a law, rule, code, standard better suited than awareness-
raising, transparency, the change of accountability requirements, or simply the call for 
ethical leadership? And what could be the role of new behavioural instruments?  
1.2 The concept of CoI – ever more confusion, ever more 
ineffectiveness? 
In everyday life, people have many roles and take many decisions that are conflictual, or 
even contradictory. As Ackerman notes (Auby et al. 2014, 3), we live in an era where people 
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are taking on ever more conflicting roles, identities, and changing loyalties. Also, in 
political life, leaders and politicians must make decisions that are based on conflicting 
interests, “bounded rationality”, limited information and are taken before the background 
of various interests and value conflicts. Conflicting interests are everywhere and emerge in 
all sorts of daily life situations.   
Contrary to this wide definition, the concept of CoI used to be a legal concept that 
(exclusively) applied to professional activities. Therefore, according to legal doctrines, a 
CoI arises only whenever interests, activities, decisions, or relationships compromise the 
loyalty or independent judgment of civil servants, or holder of public office. Thus, whereas 
in daily life, multiple conflicting interests may pull people in different directions, CoI only 
arises when these conflicting interests compromise professional obligations. According to 
the OECD (2003), “a 'conflict of interest' involves a conflict between the public duty and 
private interests of a public official, in which the public official has private-capacity 
interests which could improperly influence the performance of their official duties and 
responsibilities” (OECD 2003).   
As we will see, the distinction between CoI and conflicting interests becomes “blurred” and 
more problematic, which, again, renders the possibility to implement CoI policies ever 
more complicated. From a theoretical point, this can be explained as a result of the 
following developments:  
1.2.1 The blurring of the concepts of conflicting interests and CoI and 
financial interests and non-financial interests 
In all countries worldwide (up until the middle of the 1960s), the type of interest that the 
discourse regarding CoI addressed remained largely pecuniary – hence “objective”. The 
types of private interests that were addressed were hard, objective and measurable. Today, 
definitions of CoI become broader. They can be pecuniary, ideological, related to the 
interests of the spouse-, relatives- and relationships, emotional, linked to different moral 
constraints, loyalties, concerns, prejudgments, biases, and affiliations (Stark 2000). 
Therefore, the distinction between CoI and conflicting interests is blurring. This trend 
contributes to increasing confusion regarding the concept of CoI and the inflation of the 
concept. As Rodwin (2018) states: “Expanding the conflict-of-interest definition to include 
all potential sources of bias would make the concept a less practical tool”. The inflation of 
the concept also increases the already existing implementation challenges in the field.   
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1.2.2 The regulatory focus and ineffectiveness of rules 
Today, CoI is a borderline concept in the intersection of law, politics, economy, sociology, 
organisational behaviour and morality. This situatedness immediately also raises the deep 
question of the limits of the law and traditional compliance-based approaches. The 
broader the CoI concepts, the more these concepts “are amorphous, which reduces their 
usefulness. If ever more sorts of non-financial interests and conflicting interests are 
included within the definition of conflicts of interest, then the whole concept of interest 
will become just another phrase for bias. Trends towards broader definition led to finding 
CoI everywhere in political and administrative life.  A further broadening of the issues that 
are considered a CoI makes it ever more difficult to focus on those conflicts of interest that 
can be judged by legal means and legal instruments.    
1.2.3 The difficulty to prove that a conflicted state of mind has a CoI 
One of the most sacred principles in most legal systems is holding that a defendant is 
innocent until proven guilty of illegal behaviour. Contrary to this, conflicts of interest laws 
are, by large, prophylactic in nature. They are meant to prevent the appearance of conflicts 
of interest and sanction a potential state of mind although it is impossible to know whether 
a conflicted person acts accordingly.  It is difficult to prove whether a person (Minister) 
has been conflicted or whether the CoI had an impact on the decision taken by the person. 
CoI rules and policies could be more easily justified if it could be proved that a conflicted 
state of mind has led to conflicting consequences. Deciding and realizing when an apparent 
conflict may lead to inappropriate decision-making is difficult. As such, it is only the 
person in question who knows about its own interests and potential conflicts (David-
Barrett 2020).  
1.2.4 The difficulty to manage an individualized bad person model of 
integrity  
CoI policies are focusing on the management of individual behaviour. They address 
individual misconduct, and not organisational-, -economical-, or institutional causes of 
misconduct. Thus, differently to anti-corruption policies, CoI policies follow a so-called 
individualised “bad apples” approach. Consequently, implementation and enforcement 
strategies also follow an individualised approach as regards the monitoring of individual 
conduct. However, managing and monitoring ever more potential sources of bias using a 
conflict-of-interest framework imposes heavy burdens on professionals and institutions 
(Rodwin 2018). For example, countries continue to expand the concept of non-financial 
issues that are being defined as (potential) CoI. Especially, the latter findings are 
important, because of the difficulties involved in managing and enforcing non-financial 
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forms of CoI. Take the case of national affinity, political affinity, friendships, family 
relationships, party affiliations, associations, religious beliefs, emotional life or other 
factors that could compromise the impartiality and objectivity of a person.  Direct and 
indirect interests can also include not-economic interests, or result from involvement with 
non-governmental or political organizations (even if non remunerated), competing duties 
of loyalty between one entity the person owes a duty to and another person or entity the 
person owes a duty to.  The latter issue is the most difficult issue to monitor and enforce. 
The relationships constituting family membership vary between countries and need to be 
analyzed within the legal and cultural context. For example, the concepts of immediate 
family or spouse go significantly beyond that of the nuclear family, but its precise contours 
are not universally recognized. The European Commission takes the view that “‘immediate 
family’ should comprise, at least, the following relationships (…): The spouse (including a 
partner with whom the individual has a (non-) registered non-marital partnership), 
children and parents, (great-)grandparents and (great-)grandchildren, (half-) brothers 
and sisters (including from blended families), uncles and aunts, nieces and nephews, first-
degree cousins, parents-in-law, children-in-law, siblings-in-law, stepparents and 
stepchildren” (European Commission, OJ, C 121/1 of 9 April 2021, 8 and 9).  Apart from 
the concept of ‘immediate family’, the wider concept of close friendships, extended family, 
etc. may still lead to other forms of conflict of interests and pose a huge challenge in the 
monitoring process.    
1.2.5 The difficulty to institutionalize a “fluid subject”  
As such, the notion of risks and conflicts is subject to continuous changes. Countries 
constantly adopt new rules and policies, introduce new standards, broaden definitions and 
define new implementation and enforcement requirements. Trends are towards the 
inclusion of ever new forms of CoI: Take the case of loyalty conflicts, nonfinancial CoI of 
spouses, CoI because of the expansion of ever new forms of philanthropic activities, loyalty 
conflicts and CoI because of new opportunities to abuse information and data. In the 
Member States of the EU, trends are also towards more interaction, cooperation and 
coordination between the public- and the private sector and “a more politicized, flexible 
and ad hoc policy advisory system” (van den Berg 2017, 80). As regards Ministers, never 
had former office-holders so many opportunities for employment, visibility and influence. 
Leaving politicians are preoccupied with their historical repute, and thus they write 
memoirs, teach at universities, lead charity work and foundations and search out awards 
and prizes. Today, there are more opportunities for former office-holders than simply 
taking up a new “conflicting revolving door” job. These trends increase the likelihood of 
more CoI.  
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All of these trends towards the expansion of CoI require countries to invest ever more 
resources and capacities in the institutionalisation of ethics policies and the 
implementation of policies. This mainly concerns the management of disclosure policies 
and revolving door policies. Countries are reacting to these trends by nominating ever 
more ethical responsibilities in the field and introducing ever more ethics bodies, ethics 
inspectorates, ethics committees, ethics agencies and audit bodies (Hoekstra/Zweegers, 
2021). Responsibilities are often fragmented and coordination capacities are lacking.   
 
Figure 1. Fragmented responsibilities 
1.2.6 The naïve support of value based approaches 
Thus, if in the past there seemed to be regulatory gaps and a lack of enforcement, the more 
recent concern is that some governments have gone overboard in adopting a complex 
regulatory system and by building an elaborate ethics apparatus that reflects the prevailing 
negative assumptions about the motivations and capabilities of both politicians and public 
servants. However, all Member States are still in a process of introducing new rules, 
policies, standards and implementation requirements. One major cause for the rise of 
regulation is when political scandals and new conflicts of interests appear, failure is 
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attributed to not enough law or not strict-enough law. “Rarely is the integrity/efficiency 
trade-off even considered” (Anecharico and Jacobs 1996, 12).  
However, all of this does not suggest that deregulating ethics policies would be a solution. 
Here, it is also important to note that countries that pursue so-called value based strategies 
(like The Netherlands) do not have systems with less formal requirements and less 
administrative burdens than other countries (and often also not less rules and/or codes of 
ethics in place). Instead, they have implemented more complex ethics systems as such 
(Hoekstra/Huberts/von Montfort/Maesschalck/Demmke, 2021).   
As such, being against more rules and standards is indeed counterproductive. According 
to Kühl (2020), the effectiveness of rules depends on many conditions. First, it depends 
on whether people are aware of them, rely on them, whether the rules have a meaning, are 
understood, and whether they are enforced and sanctioned (Kühl 2020: 83).Moreover, the 
effectiveness of rules depends on whether someone refers to them, in what situation this 
happens, and what consequences one must expect if one ignores the rules (Kühl 2020: 
83).An additional criterion is how violators behave when their offense becomes known and 
how the violator is dealt with when the violation becomes known (Kühl 2000: 84).In an 
organization where violations of rules are only sanctioned in exceptional cases, it becomes 
clear that the organization does not take its own rules so seriously (Kühl 2000: 86).We will 
come back to this point when we discuss the phenomenon of toleration of violation. We 
also note at this point that shortcomings in the implementation process are not only due 
to a lack of monitoring resources and enforcement powers. Instead, another problem 
concerns the lack of motivation and willingness to enforce CoI against Ministers and top-
officials.   
1.3 Why studying ministers and conflicts of interests? 
Managing conflicts of interests, conflicting interests and 
“dirty-hands” 
Research about CoI in public policies is abundant. However, comparative research about 
CoI amongst holders of public service is rare and started only recently (Saint-Martin and 
Thompson et al. 2006; Demmke et al. 2008; Peters and Handschin et al. 2012; Auby et al. 
2014). Empirical research in the field is an exception (European Parliament 2008) and, if 
existing at all, focused on different categories of Holders of Public Office. So far, research 
about CoI of ministers represents a “black hole”.  
CoI of ministers differs in many ways from those of any other group of office-holders or 
categories of staff. More than other groups of holders of public office, ministers are 
exposed to a mixture of potential CoI and conflicting interests. They exercise important 
positions of power and influence, interact regularly with the private sector, take important 
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decisions which have a financial impact, hold important functions in boards, agencies or 
committees, possess information about important issues, allocate grants of public funds 
and are involved in appointments to top positions etc. Moreover, the change of governance 
and an increasingly commercialized public sector that works closely with the business, 
citizens and the non-governmental sector private sector gives rise to the potential of new 
forms of conflicting interests that may also lead to conflicts of interest between the 
individual public duties of officials and their private interests (OECD 2003). As senior 
members of their parties, they also wield considerable influence both inside and outside 
parliament, demonstrating considerable autonomy and discretion in their dealings with 
colleagues and the public in general. “Additionally, ministers are subject to a variety of 
pressures – answerable not only to their constituents, but unlike their backbench 
counterparts, to the cabinet, the prime minister, special interest groups and Parliament. 
These kinds of often conflicting pressures in a party-political system can be particularly 
onerous to co-ordinate and arguably expose ministers to potentially unethical situations” 
(Fleming and Holland 2000, 4). The central place of the cabinet and the ministry puts the 
power of ministers on another plane to that of parliamentarians, for example, with respect 
to expert advice, access to lobby groups and privileged information.  
In the case of ministers, the question of how to deal with conflicting interests and conflicts 
of interests is even more acute when thinking of conflicting interests and “dirty hands” 
(Walzer 1973; de Wijze 2013), which means that ministers may be caught in a situation 
where they are required to do morally wrong in order to do right. For ministers, leading a 
politically moral life is not about choosing to live a moral life without moral conflicts and 
CoI. Rather it is about knowing how to deal with moral conflicts and to manage them. The 
discussion about minister´s moral conflicts and responsibilities seem to suggest that it is 
impossible to lead a political life without conflicts of interest. In fact, balancing different 
interests is a core element of democracy, administration, and public officials. However, 
everyday conflicting interests, values, and conflicting targets or objectives as such are not 
always conflicts of interest. Often, ministers' esteem too highly their ability to deal with 
their own CoI. They also overestimate their capacity to deal in a conscious and impartial 
way with their own CoI.  
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2 METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH 
Our research interest in the study for the European Parliament was to get an overview of 
the existing rules and policies in place amongst different CoI.1 In order to be able to carry 
out a longitudinal analysis about trends from 2007 to 2020, we followed a similar method 
that was used in an earlier comparative study on a similar topic2. In order to do so, we also 
decided to carry out the survey in co-operation with the European Public Administration 
Network under the umbrella of the EU-Presidency (which is composed of top-officials 
from all Member States of the EU and officials from the European Commission). The 
functions and grades of respondents to the survey (and even some respondents) were 
almost identical to the earlier study. As regards the operationalisation of the term CoI, we 
suggested to the Member States a list of 15 different CoI, as the following table shows. 
Table 1. List of potential CoI 
1) Declaration of financial interests and 
assets  
2) HPO’s spouse’s activities  
11) Rules on receptions and representations  
 
12) Accepting gifts, decorations and  
distinctions  
3) Provisions relating to the declaration 
of interests  
4) Outside activities: Political activities  
5) Outside activities: Honorary positions  
6) Outside activities: Conferences  
7) Outside activities: Publications  
8) Professional confidentiality  
9) Professional Loyalty  
10) Missions, travels  
13) General rules on impartiality and 
conflicts of interest  
14) Specific rules on incompatibility of 
posts and professional activities before or 
during the term of office  
 
15) Restrictions on professional  
commitments or holding other posts after  
 
leaving office  
During the period from January to March 2020, a questionnaire was drafted, containing 
several open-ended and closed questions. The questionnaire was provided to the EUPAN 
                                                        
1 The original comparative study commissioned by the European Parliament assessed both ministers and top-
officials CoI policies in EU Member States. Because of the limited space, we focus solely on ministers in this 
article.  
2 However, in this study, the authors analysed the so-called regulation density index and examined more 
categories of staff from a wider group of public institutions. Still, it was possible to compare some of the 
findings of both surveys.  
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network in order to ensure that experts from all EU countries would be consulted as early 
as possible and in order to get a chance to pre-test the questionnaire. After internal 
validation of the survey, the survey was conducted by means of personal email. Ultimately, 
17 countries (excluding Germany which responded to this survey per mail) responded to 
this survey. After completion, we analysed and filtered all answers and identified those 
which were either still missing or unclear. In those cases, the respective countries were re-
contacted on a bilateral basis in a “third round”.   
Our survey followed partly the tradition of elite studies although our respondents were 
officials who are supposed to provide official data that does not reflect personal opinions. 
In administrative elite studies, top-officials are members of organizations with expected 
higher reliability, institutional knowledge, and experience. Putting forward questions to 
politicians or lower-level civil servants would increase the risk of receiving less 
“representative” information. In fact, in most countries, the delivered data was discussed 
internally and coordinated with several other persons, anticorruption agencies, and 
ministries.   
On the other hand, experience shows that official responses to empirical surveys differ 
according to the choice of the target groups. For example, leaders respond differently than 
technical staff and official sources differ from academic sources. Government responses 
are often more positive than individual responses by public employees. Thus, we know the 
respondents in our survey represent official government sources and that answers to the 
survey necessarily differ as to if we had collected samples in each country by different 
employment groups. We acknowledge the danger of sources of bias when only asking 
higher-ranking officials to provide official data. These officials may have an interest in 
reporting favorable outcomes to present a positive image on the international scene.   
To operationalize and to measure the existing policies and instruments in the Member 
States, we introduced the term “policy coverage density” which defines the quantitative 
degree of coverage of conflict of issues by laws, rules and codes. If a Member State 
regulates/manages all conflict of interest issues, the country has a high degree of coverage 
density.   
The data gained from the survey was subsequently analysed with data from different 
surveys such as Eurobarometer, Gallup trust polls, Transparency International corruption 
indices or Quality of Government data from the University of Gothenburg to inter alia 
examine the relationship between the policy coverage density, trust, tolerance of 
corruption etc.  
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2.1 Discussion and shortcomings of the survey 
In this article, we intend to provide a comprehensive picture of the CoI challenges in EU 
Member States during a turbulent context that was characterized by the COVID-19 
pandemic. Despite a very high interest in the survey, some countries decided to refrain 
from participating in the survey because of other (emergency) priorities and high 
workloads as a reaction to the unfolding crisis.  
However, the most important challenge when comparing and analysing ethics rules and 
standards for ministers concerned the access to data and to obtain honest answers to 
sensitive and complex questions. Despite the intensive work of the OECD in the field of 
CoI, overall, comparative data is scarce, and it is also vulnerable to change and 
manipulation. Also, in this study, not only the availability but also the reliability of data 
was a sore point in the development of this comparative work. In our survey, this mainly 
concerned open questions on the development of CoI and questions about the nature and 
effectiveness of ethics committees. Overall, we concluded that no country is generating 
data in the field of CoI. The lack of data makes any research difficult and somehow a 
subject of speculation. We suggest that valuable further research should address and focus 
on data management and monitoring issues in the field.  
Instead of providing data, some countries responded to our survey by adding long lists of 
existing rules in the field. We noted that the Member States face increasing challenges as 
to the quality of the existing rules. Overall, there is no shortage of rules and standards in 
the field of conflicts of interest. Differently to other policy areas, no country is applying 
regulatory impact assessments or assessing administrative burdens of CoI policies.   
In addition, CoI are managed by different authorities, agencies, administrative units, and 
persons. As for the legal situation, the institutional landscape is highly fragmented. In 
some countries, different institutions are also responsible for monitoring CoI policies for 
ministers.   
In doing this type of research, it became also evident that there can be too little or too much 
attention on theoretical issues, too little or too much focus on historical explanations, or a 
too general analysis without taking into consideration the many existing specific features 
of the national systems, avoidance of different linguistic meanings and definitions, etc. 
Moreover, the existing national arrangements are in a constant process of change and it 
seems that change is happening at ever faster speeds. If decades ago, public administration 
and politics was a synonym for stability, today it is a symbol for hasty change.  
In addition, there are challenges in comparing and analysing the different (legal, political, 
organisational and HR-) instruments in different legal and administrative traditions and 
in many languages. Although countries could answer to this study in seven languages, this 
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comparative study was carried out in English. Naturally, national respondents to the 
survey were asked to respond to terminology that may not be understood universally 
across all EU countries. Therefore, we used a considerable amount of time in comparing 
and analysing the different national linguistic definitions of the concept of CoI.  
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3 FROM BUREAUCRATIC TO BEHAVIOURIST APPROACHES 
We note that the Member States have shifted their attention from a combination of 
compliance- and value-based approaches to new strategies that also add behavioral 
approaches. As behavioral approaches focus on individual decision-making motives (and 
not on organisational or institutional causes for misconduct), CoI policies – increasingly 
– require sophisticated and complex examinations into individual motives, individual 
behavior and individual decision-making (Stark 2000).  
After decades of focusing on the adoption of rules, the Member States have started to invest 
in the institutionalisation of ethics policies and the implementation of policies. In times of 
de-bureaucratisation, CoI policies are becoming ever more bureaucratic. The increasing 
investment by Member States in the implementation of ethics policies leads to a 
fragmentation of institutional responsibilities, making it more difficult to clarify 
responsibilities. Monitoring oversight of Minister CoI issues is challenging because of the 
rarity of independent, depoliticized- and outside control.  Overall, oversight and control 
tasks are shared amongst various actors:  
• Court of Auditors with responsibilities in auditing ethics policies;  
• Ombud officers with responsibilities in managing maladministration;  
• HR departments with ethical responsibilities as regards recruitment- and 
disclosure policies;  
• Integrity Officers, Ethics Commissioners, or Presidents with various advisory and 
supervisory functions;  
• Decentralised ethics committees/Centralised Ethics Committees with various 
responsibilities for one or several institutions;  
• Specific Recruitment and Appointment Bodies with responsibilities to avoid CoI in 
the process;  
• Specific Revolving-Door Bodies;  
• Courts with legal- and disciplinary control- and sanction responsibilities.  
Compared with earlier decades, HR-, Integrity- and compliance officers must check and 
manage many more rules, ethical standards and disclosure requirements. As regards 
implementation and enforcement practices, this also requires the constant adaptation of 
knowledge and skills of those who oversee the conduct of individuals. However, as such, 
individualised monitoring is difficult, complex, time-consuming and increasingly costly. 
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Trends towards a further individualisation of ethics policies and the broadening of CoI 
concepts make it ever more complex and difficult to manage and sanction individual 
breaches of CoI policies, while at the same time not necessarily contributing to more 
effectiveness.   
These trends must be seen before the background that countries have not only 
implemented more rules in general, they have also implemented more rules on a broad 
range of CoI issues. Our longitudinal data shows that nearly every country has more rules 
and policies in place today than in 2007.  
  
 
Figure 2. Average Policy Coverage Density by Member State from 2007-2020  
As the survey results show, amongst the 15 analysed CoI policies, every CoI issue has a 
higher policy coverage density than a decade ago. 
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Figure 3. Average Policy Coverage Density by CoI issue from 2007-2020  
Our survey also confirms the findings of an earlier study (European Parliament 2008) 
which shows that – structurally – the Central and Eastern European countries have higher 
regulated systems than, for example, the Northern European countries. Overall, Sweden 
stands out as the least regulated system. For example, Northern European countries have 
no rules in place as regards spouse activities (such as obligations to declare income, or 
assets), whereas this issue is very densely regulated in Central European countries as well 
as Continental European countries. This can be explained by the fact that Northern 
European countries are much more careful when balancing privacy rights with obligations 
to disclosing private interests.  
This allows for the conclusion that the design of the national ethics infrastructure and 
ethics legal system is linked to the national context. If trust in Government is higher, there 
may also be less need for regulation. As such, these findings are not surprising. However, 
they also allow for the conclusion that – in the field of ethics – it is difficult to suggest best-
practices in the field of ethics infrastructure, for example, according to the suggestions 
made by the OECD (2020).  
Apart from the analysis of the list of all potential CoI issues we also examined the situation 
as regards the group of most important CoI (see Table 1.) in order to get more comparable 
evidence about the core CoI issues. In all countries  
(except for Luxemburg and the Netherlands), the use of law is the predominant form of 
regulation. This shows that  
Member States are still having a strong belief in compliance-based approaches. We also 
note that most Member States of the EU have adopted general anti-corruption or anti-
fraud laws (which include CoI provisions). However, only few EU countries have also 
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adopted CoI laws and regulations that apply to government as such.  Thus, only few 
countries have adopted general CoI laws which apply to all institutions. Instead, most 
countries have different and separate rules for different institutions.   
 
Figure 4. Coverage of most important CoI issues – use of law  
Overall, Member States that entered the EU in 2005 (and later) have a higher level of policy 
coverage density (more rules and policies in place) than older Member States. Northern 
European countries have fewer rules and policies in place than the other EU Member 
States. Next, countries with higher corruption levels have more rules and policies in place 
(higher coverage density) than countries with lower levels of corruption. The latter can be 
interpreted differently: a) more rules and policies are not effective in the fight against 
corruption and CoI, b) more rules and policies are a reaction to high levels of corruption 
and policies and distrust in politicians. Finally, we note that classical bureaucratic 
countries (like Luxemburg) have a higher policy coverage density than countries with more 
(private sector) managerial types of public administrations (like the Netherlands).  
3.1 More investments in implementation of CoI policies, but 
also more moral relativism and toleration? 
A popular assumption is that highly effective Governance systems do not tolerate 
corruption and CoI. In these systems, the interpretation of the rule of law does not only 
mean that all people are treated equally before the law. In addition, these systems have a 
culture in which civil servants implicitly expect from each other that the law is applied. 
They do not accept if certain legal requirements are set aside in a given personal context, 
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situation, or if politicians ask them not to apply parts of the law (see also Basu 2020: 117). 
Contrary to this, toleration of corruption and CoI correlates with poor Governance 
performance. Our empirical analysis indeed shows that systems that have lower 
democratic standards and perform less well as regards the rule of law accept corruption 
and CoI more easily than systems with high standards.   
However, attitudes towards universally applicable values and rules seem to change in all 
countries. At least in international politics, in the past decade, a trend towards moral 
relativism in (international) politics has taken place, meaning that the acceptance of 
universal values and principles decreased, while – at the same time - ethics and values as 
political instruments have gained in importance. Moreover, value management and the 
general attention to purpose driven management seem to be increasing. Current, trends 
also lead to increased politicization of ethics policies, as elected political actors try to 
reassert the primacy of political interest in the ethics policy process.  
Accordingly, we suppose this trend supports the politicisation of ethics policies, the 
toleration of CoI of ministers, and increasing reluctance to monitor and to sanction CoI of 
ministers. This assumption also explains why levels of corruption seem to increase 
although the anti-corruption movement is as powerful as never before. Another 
explanation is that “the underperformance of the global anticorruption movement is not 
unrelated to the democratic backsliding in recent years” (Mungiu-Pippidi 2020, 100). 
Strangely enough, the anti-corruption agenda has helped populists into power who protest 
the seemingly corrupt (democratic) elites. Our empirical analysis shows that systems that 
have lower democratic standards and perform less well as regards the rule of law accept 
corruption and CoI more easily than systems with high standards. Also, systems that have 
highly effective Governance systems do not tolerate corruption and CoI. Contrary to this, 
toleration of corruption and CoI correlates with poor Governance performance. Also, 
politicians abuse ethics policies irresponsibly for their personal self-interest 
(Grandstanding) and as a political weapon against political opponents (Tosi and Warmke 
2020; Driver 2005; Neuhäuser and Seidel 2020). As such, ethics is also used for self-
promotion (Tosi and Warmke 2020). Parallel to this, public expectations about ethical 
behaviour have risen, as has public scandal-reporting. Like this, trends in the field of 
political ethics are as much towards “excessively demanding moralism” (Driver 2005: 137; 
Neuhäuser & Seidel 2020) whereas trends in international politics are towards a growing 
disrespect for universal values and moral relativism (Lukes 2008). This combination of 
egoistic ethicality and moral relativism influences the effectiveness of ethics policies. For 
example, moral relativism is linked to “tolerance to intolerant” (Walzer 1998: 98).  
At the same time, it is striking that many people who vote for populist leaders are rarely 
interested in the corruptibility of these leaders and their conflicts of interests. Many people 
are surprisingly tolerant as regards unethical behaviour and conflicts of interests of their 
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leaders (and despite rising moral expectations, trends towards the personalisation of 
ethical failures and the increase of scandal reporting).  On the other hand, all politicians 
share the view that corruption is destructive. The same applies to the field of CoI. 
Therefore, neither corruption nor conflicts of interests are tolerated. How can this be 
explained?  
As it seems, people often think in the context of two opposite conflicting intuitions:   
• One is the thought that there are actions that are right or wrong universally. Thus, 
we share the intuition that there are right and clear answers to moral questions 
such as judging CoI.  
• The other intuition is captured by the question: Who are we to judge other 
opinions, acts or even other cultures? Who are we to apply our moral standards to 
other moral actions, or systems? Who are we to know whether somebody really has 
a CoI? After all, a CoI is a psychological state of mind, and, in most cases, we do 
not know whether and how people act.    
The first intuition leads us to make moral judgments, the other to abstain from doing so. 
Moral judgment is moralism and an attitude that we have an answer to complicated issues. 
The other intuition is moral relativism and rather abstention of moral judgment which is 
not the same as tolerance (Lukes 2008).  
Both intuitions may be wrong, or at least not right as regards the judgment of many CoI. 
The reason for this is that conflicts are not binary; that is, they are not simply either good 
or bad, present or absent or severe or not severe. However, monitoring and enforcing CoI 
requires in both ways the need for judgement. In certain cases, it is relatively easy to judge 
that certain CoI are wrong and should be avoided or prevented. However, in most cases, it 
is difficult to come up with a clear judgement. People also shy away from judging others' 
behaviour if they find themselves in similar conflicting situations.  
Therefore, in many cases, they are also tolerant if ministers face CoI. This tolerance for CoI 
reflects current trends towards moral relativism. We define moral relativism as the idea 
that the authority of moral norms is relative to time and place (Lukes 2008). It is the 
observation of diversity and the acceptance that moral judgment is not constraint by place, 
time and context. It is the acceptance of relativism and diversity as a universal principle. 
Consequently, personal violations of norms are “human” behaviour and therefore, 
tolerated, also as a protest against norms that have been adopted by “political elites”.  
In our survey, more than 30% of national responses concluded that one of the biggest 
challenges in fighting conflicts of interest is “political reluctance to sanction”. One country 
mentioned a “too high tolerance for CoI of ministers” and one country “trends towards 
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politicization”. Obviously, these answers reveal a lack of political will and/or too high levels 
of tolerance against flagrant CoI. How can this be explained in times where countries 
invest in the fight against CoI as much effort as never before?  
One answer to this question can be found in a related policy-field: The fight against 
corruption. According to Eurobarometer (2020), one structural deficit in the fight against 
corruption (and also in the field of CoI) is the reluctance (and tolerance) to fight high-level 
cases. During the most recent period, this could be seen as regards the toleration of CoI by 
top-politicians, prime-ministers and presidents which did not have any significant impact 
on (dis) approval ratings. However, this toleration is not only politically motivated. In fact, 
in the field of conflicts of interest, a particular act can “evoke different opinions on whether 
it was morally right or wrong” (Kerkhoff & Overem, 2021, 83). The latter mainly concerns 
the evaluation of revolving door cases, which can turn out to be extremely complex 
individual cases (and may be very difficult to monitor and to assess from the point of view 
of the enforcing officials).  
Moreover, also the judgments that citizens bring to bear upon integrity violations are often 
ambivalent. The boundaries that separate the condemned from the acceptable not only 
shift from person to person but also shift according to the facts of the case under evaluation 
and the context in which they take place. Although citizens are highly critical, distrustful 
and disapprove of breaches of integrity, this may not prevent them from tolerating many 
different forms of unethical behaviour. This suggests, that even if rules exist and breaches 
of integrity emerge, they will have little effect if citizens tolerate these breaches. 
The judgment that citizens bring to bear upon different forms of conflict of interest is often 
ambivalent. “The boundaries that separate the condemned from the acceptable not only 
shift from person to person, but also shift from according to the facts of the case under 
evaluation and the context in which they take place. The confusion of public and private 
interests, and the resulting conflicts, generally escape disapproval. Often, conflicts of 
interest are not perceived of as such” (Lascoumes 2014, 83–84).   
Even more, “while a strong sentiment of disapproval regarding breaches of integrity 
resides within citizens, it coexists with a de facto tolerance of certain abuses of power in 
elected office officials, and even with considerable tolerance towards the near absence of 
political consequences” (Lascoumes 2014, 84). In their replies to our survey, a number of 
Member States mentioned that important challenges exist in tackling CoI because CoI of 
ministers are tolerated and Governments are reluctant to address political CoI. Of course, 
if leaders commit CoI and these are tolerated, this will most likely result in a further decline 
in trust in political leadership, ethical leadership and rolemodelling. But why then do 
countries tolerate CoI of political leaders (and other than because of political influence and 
power)? As such, political CoI are almost always tolerated (at least to a certain extent) as 
long as these concern minor conflicting political interests. This is also reflected in the Code 
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of Conduct for the European Commissioners, which allows for the participation “in 
national politics as members of national political parties or an organisation of the social 
partners” (Art. 9 para 1) and also the participation “in European politics as members of 
European political parties or organisations of the social partners” (Art. 10 para. 1). 
Obviously, both activities may generate CoI that are in conflict with the duties of an EU 
Commissioner. However, these activities are accepted, even if there exists no evidence 
whether politicians can balance and mitigate these conflicts.  
3.2 Purpose and objective of CoI policies – “dreams” fulfilled? 
Obviously, the effects of public management reforms always depend on the different 
national political and institutional contexts (Lapuente and Van de Walle 2020; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2011).  However, expectations as to the effects of CoI policies are the same 
everywhere. For example, in our survey, all the Member States expect CoI policies to 
provide a tool for preventing and reducing CoI. In addition, most national and 
international regulations and code also mention other objectives such as:     
Increase public trust in the government.   
• Demonstrate the high level of integrity of most elected representatives and 
Government officials.   
• Deter conflicts of interest from arising because official activities would be subject 
to public scrutiny.    
• Deter persons whose personal finances would not bear up to public scrutiny from 
entering public service.    
• Better enable the public to judge the performance of public officials in the light of 
their outside financial interests.   
Besides these main objectives, there is also a common understanding that CoI should not 
undermine nor contract the achievement of other policy objectives such as the need to: 
• Reduce administrative burdens and red tape.   
• Retain the attractiveness of public sector employment in times of demographic 
challenges.    
• Protect privacy.   
• Enhance accountability of Holders of Public Office.   
• Increase transparency, accountability and citizen orientation.   
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As such, many of these objectives take the character of wishing lists in a contradictory 
context. For example, how to maintain the attractiveness of public sector employment, if 
countries introduce ever-stricter revolving-door policies?  
How to reduce red-tape and administrative burdens if countries introduce ever more rules 
and standards in the field? How to increase transparency in the field while protecting 
privacy? How to institutionalise powerful ethics policies in times of budgetary constraints? 
How to monitor CoI policies if countries themselves have no data and oversight about the 
development of CoI cases? How to enforce CoI of ministers in times of increasing 
politicisation of ethics policies? How to evaluate the contributions of CoI policies to trust 
developments?  
In our survey, we focused on carrying out research about the two most important 
objectives of CoI, which are shared by all Member States:  
• CoI should prevent and reduce CoI.   
• CoI policies should contribute to generating more trust in holders of public office.  
In the following, we will discuss the outcomes of our research.  
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4 EVIDENCE ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF COI POLICIES – 
TOWARDS BETTER PREVENTION AND LESS COI? 
Like corruption, CoI is notoriously difficult to measure. Consequently, there is still very 
little evidence of whether conflicts of interest and corruption are increasing or decreasing. 
A study by Mackenzie (2008, 98) came to the following conclusion: “Worry about the 
ethics of public officials greatly exceeds formal evidence of ethical violations.” Remarkably, 
no country provides statistical evidence about the development of CoI over time.  
Although our data, for the reason mentioned above, do not allow for definitive answers 
about the effectiveness of CoI policies, it allows for the drawing of some important 
conclusions. Table 3 displays the national answers as regards the most important 
challenges in the field of CoI. Obviously, this is a highly sensitive question and allowing for 
“politicised and biased” answers. In contrast, it does underpin the validity of the answers 
received, as there is no political incentive to lie about existing challenges other than deny 
them. Interestingly, when taking a look back at the policy coverage density in figure 1, it 
appears that mainly the countries with higher levels of policy coverage density admit facing 
challenges, with the exception of Austria, Latvia and Sweden. While this does not suggest 
that countries with lower levels of policy coverage density perform better, it does indicate 
that ever more regulation certainly does not lead automatically to more effectiveness. 
Table 2. Countries confirming challenges as the greatest in managing CoI  
g1 (revolving doors)  
Austria*, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia  
g2 (post-employment)  
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Hungary, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden  
g3 (lack of monitoring experts)  Austria, Czech Republic, Portugal  
g4 (lack of financial resources)  Austria, Czech Republic, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia  
g5 (political reluctance to 
sanction)  
Austria, Czech Republic, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, 
Sweden  
g6 (grey zones)  
Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Latvia, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Slovakia  
g7 (high tolerance for CoI of 
ministers)  Austria, Portugal  
g8 (high complexity of the issues)  
Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Sweden  
g9 (trends toward politization)  Austria, Slovakia  
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While corruption is arguably not the same as CoI, underperformance on corruption 
prevention can certainly be used as a proxy to draw conclusions about the general 
approach towards ethical misconduct. As such, our data show that countries with higher 
levels of policy coverage density are generally attributed worse scores on the Transparency 
International Corruption Index. Additionally, these countries do also score low on the 
Freedom House Index measuring the effectiveness of corruption prevention. This has 
important implications for the assessment of effectiveness. It allows for the conclusion that 
simply regulating more does not lead to better management of corruption. Higher policy 
coverage density does also not suggest a high quality of the policies adopted. In this case, 
even better implementation will not suffice to tackle CoI effectively. 
Preventing and reducing CoI is difficult because of the relationship between Good 
Governance and the acceptability of corruption. As such, in countries with a higher 
democracy index, there is also less acceptance for corruption. Or, vice versa: In countries 
where the democracy index is lower, the acceptance for corruption is also higher.  Also, 
countries with better safeguards against corruption have generally higher scores on the 
democracy index. Thus, if countries want to take the fight against unethical behaviour 
seriously, an important precondition for this is to – simultaneously – maintain or 
strengthen systems of Good Governance. We also note the same logic as regards the 
situation of the rule of law. The higher the rule of law index of a country, the less acceptance 
for corruption. Or vice versa: The lower the rule of law index in a country, the higher is the 
acceptance for corruption. 
  
Figure 5. Relationship between acceptability of corruption and state of rule of law 
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Explanation: 1: Austria, 2: Belgium, 3: Bulgaria, 4: Czech Republic, 5: France, 6: Hungary, 
9: Netherlands, 10: Portugal, 11: Romania, 13: Slovenia, 14: Spain, 15: Sweden  
We note a positive, although not statistically significant, relationship between the 
Government Integrity and the unacceptability of corruption. As such, this confirms the 
hypotheses that Good Governance and “ethics pay off”. We further discovered that 
Government Integrity is higher in countries with lower levels of policy coverage density 
and that countries with better safeguards to prevent corruption have on average higher 
Government Integrity. From this, we also draw the conclusion that adopting rules and 
policies is not enough. Instead, it is important to invest in high quality integrity policies 
and Good Governance policies as well as implementing them properly. These findings are 
not new. More important is the empirical confirmation, according to which effective 
integrity policies pay off in terms of satisfaction with the functioning of the democratic 
system. If people trust in the effectiveness of ethics policies, they are also likely to trust the 
public institutions and the political system, which is based on Good Governance principles.  
However, this only means that – in order to prevent and reduce CoI – certain 
preconditions need to be fulfilled, such as Good Governance policies. Still, in all countries, 
there is a trade-off between the growing complexity of our societies, the broadening of CoI 
concepts, the adoption of new policies, the emergence of new CoI, and the increasing 
number of violations. “There are many more laws to be broken nowadays.” (Rosenthal 
2006, 163). This does not mean that people have become more unethical.  
Moral and ethical standards are also changing more rapidly than before. What was legal a 
generation ago is considered corrupt today. As discussed, regulation in the field of CoI also 
takes a stronger prophylactic approach. Prohibitions are regulated for an increasing 
variety of circumstances. Requirements for disclosure of interests have shifted from an 
(original) concentration on financial issues into other non-pecuniary commitments. Also, 
public opinion has shifted towards an objective conception of conflict and a subjective 
conception of personal interests. Finally, media coverage about scandals has dramatically 
increased and, thus, supports views that unethical behaviour is increasing. In the academic 
field, most experts believe that new governance trends generate more opportunities for  
CoI. Still, there exists no longitudinal empirical research on the development of CoI during 
the last decades. Moreover, countries provide no statistical evidence on trends. Because of 
the existence of these limitations, it is impossible to say whether CoI are increasing, or 
decreasing.  
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4.1 Conflicts of Interest policies and trust – a complex 
relationship 
Ethics measures are often introduced by politicians with an eye on the perceived problem 
of decreasing public trust in their own political class. However, the intention of increasing 
public trust is rarely met (Rosenson 2006, 137). In fact, why do public authorities “feel the 
need to justify public integrity? The habitual answer goes in order to breed trust amongst 
citizens (…). However, a commitment to public integrity implies an obligation to disclose 
the government´s lack of integrity. And this, it should be stressed, is not likely to promote 
trust in government. Justifying integrity by means of trust, then, produces a paradox. On 
the one hand, the government´s sincere commitment to integrity entails an obligation to 
reveal its violations of integrity, which is not likely to increase trust. On the other hand, a 
government cannot refrain from making these revelations, for that would constitute a 
violation of the commitment to integrity” (Nieuwenburg 2007, 21).  
Most ethics experts think that more rules, even if well managed, may not automatically 
build more trust. Contrary to this, new rules may even decrease public trust. As Behnke 
(2005) shows “in spite of the individual rationality of these strategies, the collective 
irrationality lies in the fact that ever more transparency, ever higher standards and tighter 
regulations create ever more violations of ethical rules, more scandals and more 
investigations, thus undermining the legitimacy of the institution and destroying public 
trust and creating collective costs that far outweigh the individual benefits.” The 
assumption on the part of the legislators and Members of Government who favour the 
adoption of new rules and standards is that this will have a positive effect and increase 
public trust in Government. However, a strong focus on ethics, too strict approaches, too 
much publicity, and too many rules may also undermine public trust. Therefore, present 
trends towards the adoption of more rules and policies do not necessarily provide for an 
efficient response to conflicts of interests, the decline of public trust, and may cause even 
more cynicism regarding national, European, and political institutions as such.   
As trust is a manifold issue, we tried to operationalise the term by testing various variables, 
asking for opinions related to trust. As such, we found the following relationships between 
trust and the policy coverage density of EU Member States. However, it needs to be noted 
that these findings don’t represent statistically significant results, as the number of 
observed cases would make any generalization vague.  
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Table 3. The relationship between trust and policy coverage density  
1. The higher the policy coverage density, the higher the general trust levels 
2. The lower the policy coverage density, the more people believe that bribery and 
abuse of power is widespread among politicians (Note: very slight effect!) 
3. The lower the policy coverage density, the more people believe that bribery and 
abuse of power is widespread among political parties (Note: very slight effect!) 
4. The higher the policy coverage density, the more people believe that corruption is 
widespread in their respective country 
5. The higher the policy coverage density, the more people believe that corruption does 
not exist in their respective country 
6. The higher the policy coverage density, the more people believe that close ties 
between politics and business lead to corruption (Note: very slight effect!) 
7. The lower the policy coverage density, the more people believe that corruption cases 
are not pursued sufficiently 
8. The higher the policy coverage, the more people believe that government compacts 
corruption effectively 
9. The higher the policy coverage density, the more people believe that anti-corruption 
measures are applied impartially 
According to Auby et al. (2014) “the level of public trust in government… impacts the 
choice of legislation”. It is often thought that countries with lower trust levels have more 
rules in place than countries with higher trust levels. This is contradictory to our findings. 
At first, it might seem the only thing this – admittedly – contradictory table is telling us is 
that there is no answer to the question if higher policy coverage density leads to more trust 
in government (as anticipated by many politicians). However, this is not entirely true. For 
once, trust is only slightly higher, the higher the policy coverage density. Further, the result 
is influenced by Luxembourg and the Netherlands, the only two countries with high policy 
coverage density and high trust levels. On the other hand, countries like the Czech 
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Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia also have very high policy coverage density but 
low trust levels. As such, while the general trend might slightly suggest otherwise, a closer 
look at the cases shows that the majority of countries with very high policy coverage density 
actually suffers from low trust levels. Harder to explain is, nevertheless, the fact that in 
these countries’ governments are believed to combat corruption effectively. A logical 
explanation seems to be that only a few cases are actually considered as corruption and 
can, thus, be combatted more easily. Importantly, it has also to be noted that high policy 
coverage density does not suggest a high quality of the implemented rules. As such, 
enhancing trust by decreasing the number of scandals through ever more rules doesn’t 
work if the rules are ineffective.  
These findings show even more how contested the issue of trust actually is and how 
differently it can be interpreted.  
As all the variables, except the variable for trust in general, stem from the same 
Eurobarometer data (European Commission 2020), one would expect to find a coherent 
pattern. The fact that this is not the case does further suggest that the participants of the 
survey don’t have a coherent opinion themselves. It is also important to note that, while 
more variables indicate higher trust in countries with higher policy coverage density, 
correlation is not causation. Our findings show no clear pattern and even if they would, 
this would not suggest that higher policy coverage leads to more trust. Simply that there is 
correlation between those two, as the number of cases does not allow for reliable 
regression analysis. To summarize, our data does not suggest a negative effect of higher 
policy coverage density on trust, but neither a positive effect. It can, thus, at least be 
questioned if the objective of increasing trust by implementing more regulation is actually 
achieved.  
However, one should also not overemphasize this explanatory variable. Would deregulate 
ethics policies and standards increase trust levels? As such, being against more rules and 
standards is risky – from a political point of view. Overall, ethics policies are becoming 
more and more politicised. Ethics is slowly emerging as a perfect policy field in electoral 
campaigns. Politicians can be sure that calls for new initiatives will be applauded by the 
citizenry because these calls reflect a widespread perception in European societies that 
levels of corruption and conflicts of interest are increasing, and something must be done. 
From the point of view of a Holder of Public Office (and even more of an elected 
representative, a legislator, or a minister) it would not only be detrimental to be against 
new or even higher ethical standards. In fact, the call for higher ethical standards and 
tighter rules of ethics are more and more the subject of election campaigns in many 
countries.     
The downside of this development is that it becomes more difficult to avoid that ethics as 
a policy issue is abused as moral stigmatisation. More and more politicians use 
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“accusations of unethical conduct as a political weapon...” (Williams, 1978, 41). Rules of 
ethics are resources that politicians mobilise to attack and discredit their opponents.  
Consequently, ethics are increasingly used as a moral instrument with the aim of 
denouncing political opponents.    
This illustrates how CoI are related to the national context. The level of public trust affects 
the choice of instrument. However, the solution to the problem is not to deregulate CoI 
rules and policies to increase public trust. In fact, deregulation would most likely not 
improve the situation in low trust countries. As such, there is no clear answer to this 
dilemma. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
Because of the limited effects of both compliance-based and value-based approaches, there 
is growing insecurity about the next strategy to follow and the best regulatory mix, the role 
of self-regulation, the effectiveness of deterrence mechanisms and sanctions, the quality 
of regulation and the need for other political, behavioural and economical instruments. As 
our study show, EU Member States find themselves in a process in which they constantly 
add more rules, stricter standards, broader definitions and more investments in an 
emerging ethics bureaucracy. However, outcomes seem to be frustrating.  
Results of our survey also largely confirmed the study results of an earlier survey 
(European Parliament, 2008) which concluded that there is a clear relationship between 
the nature of administration and the policy coverage density: Countries with a more 
classical bureaucratic system manage CoI much more detailed by laws and regulations 
than more private sector like managerial systems who prefer the use of codes of ethics. 
However, we find no evidence whether the so-called compliance based-models or the value 
based-models are more or less effective. Instead, both systems demonstrate various 
shortcomings in the institutionalization and enforcement of CoI policies. In addition to the 
above-mentioned study, we also found a clear link between the political situation within a 
country and the acceptance of CoI. To summarise the main implications of our findings: 
Ever more and ever stricter regulation does not enhance the policy effectiveness. However, 
this does not suggest a pathway for deregulation. The reasons for this may rather be 
shortcomings in the effective implementation as well as the low quality of the adopted 
policies. More research is needed to strengthen this conclusion.  
For example, the toleration and shortcomings in the implementation and enforcement of 
CoI are higher in countries with lower ratings in democracy, rule of law, transparency, 
Good Governance etc. Overall, systems based on Good Governance have lower tolerance 
levels for unethical conduct. Contrary to this, countries with lower ratings in democracy, 
rule of law and integrity also have higher levels of acceptability of corruption.   
The downside regarding the politicization of ethics policies is that it becomes more difficult 
to avoid that ethics as a policy issue are abused as moral stigmatisation and abused by 
populists. Overall, ministers and top-officials are subject to increased public and media 
scrutiny and an exponential rise of ethical and moral scandals. While it can be doubted 
that holders of public office have become more unethical as such, generalised and inflated 
use of the term moral scandal, the increased (digital) media visibility of scandals and the 
political abuse of moral issues have negative side-effects on trust perceptions. To this 
should be added the problem that – often - CoI of ministers are tolerated and not enforced. 
Overall, conflict of interest policies remain ineffective even if governments slowly establish 
impressive ethics bureaucracies. As such, ethics policies fill the gap of ever new “unethical” 
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effects of other Governance logics. If ethics policies and ethical logics are not integrated 
into other organizational and systemic logics, too much is expected of ethics policies. In 
fact, Governments and EU administrations are advised to focus on Good Governance 
policies and on the development of institutional integrity models, considering concepts of 
organizational justice and fairness.    
Still, detecting, managing and measuring CoI policies involves some of the greatest 
challenges and difficulties in legal, political, organizational, behavioural and 
administrative sciences. The management of conflicts of interests “is like aiming at a 
moving target and requires careful and flexible consideration” (Kerkhoff & Overem, 2021, 
91). Countries find themselves in a paradox: Whereas politicians must be subject to tough 
scrutiny and the highest standards, it is nonetheless unrealistic to expect that legal and 
managerial ambitions solve the ever new emerging CoI issues once and for all (Kerkhoff & 
Overem, 2021, 91).  
There were a few obstacles that prevented doing full-fledged quantitative research. As 
such, there is a need for more research that is, quantitatively speaking, more rigorous. The 
same can be said for critically assessing the relationship between administrative reforms 
and public ethics. It was not possible to gather data from all 27 EU Member States, 
meaning it was only possible to work with smaller-n analysis. Hence, more sophisticated 
regression analyses were not reliable. Also, many of the survey questions were politically 
sensitive and only a few member states replied. For explorative research, the data allows 
drawing some interesting conclusions, while it makes proper statistical analysis much 
harder. The overall goal of this research is not the generalizability but understanding 
development in the EU Member States.  
University of Vaasa Reports     35 
References  
Anechiarico, Frank, and Jacobs, James B. 1996. The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.  
Auby, Jean-Bernard, Emmanuel Breen, and Thomas Perroud. (Eds.) 2014. Corruption 
and Conflicts of Interest. Cheltenham: Edgar Elgar.  
Basu, K. (2020). The Republic of Beliefs. Princeton: Princeton University Press  
Behnke, Nathalie. 2005. "Ethics as Apple Pie: The arms race of ethical standards in 
congressional and presidential campaigns.” Paper presented in EGPA "Ethics and 
Integrity of Governance: A transatlantic dialogue", Leuven, June 2005. 
Breaky, Hugh, Tim Cadman, and Charles Sampford. 2015. “Conceptualising Personal and 
Institutional Integrity: The Comprehensive Integrity Framework.” The Ethical 
Contribution of Organizations to Society 14 (1): 1–40.  
Cropanzano, Russell, and Robert Folger. 1991. Procedural justice and worker motivation. 
In Steers, R. M. & Porter, L. W. (Eds.), Motivation and Work Behavior (5th edition) (pp. 
131–143). New York: McGraw-Hill. 
David-Barrett, Elizabeth. 2020. “Regulating conflicts of interest in public office.” In 
Graycar, A. (Ed.), Handbook on Corruption, Ethics and Integrity in Public 
Administration. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.  
Davies, William. 2019. Nervous States: How Feeling Took Over the World. New York: 
Vintage.  
Demmke, Christoph, and Timo Moilanen 2012. Effectiveness of Public-Service Ethics and 
Good Governance in the Central Administration of the EU-27. Peter Lang.  
Demmke, Christoph. 2020. “Public Administration Reform Over Time: Did Change Lead 
to a More Effective Integrity Management?” Central European Public Administration 
Review 18 (2): 71–91.  
Demmke, C./Autioniemi, J./Lenner, F./Paulini, M. 2021. , The Effectiveness of Conflicts 
of Interest Policies. A Comparative Study of Holders of Public Office in the Eu Member 
States. Peter Lang: Frankfurt/M. 
Driver, J. (2005). ‘Moralism’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 22 (2), 137–151. 
European Commission. 2020. Eurobarometer. Special Report 502 on Corruption.  
European Parliament. 2008. Regulating Conflicts of Interest for Holders of Public Office 
in the European Union. Office of Official Publication of the EU.  
European Parliament. 2020. The Effectiveness of Conflict of Interest Policies in the EU-
member States. Study Requested by the JURI committee. 
University of Vaasa Reports     36 
Ewert, Benjamin. 2020. “Moving Beyond the Obsession with Nudging Individual 
Behaviour: Towards a Broader Understanding of Behavioural Public Policy.” Public Policy 
and Administration 35 (3): 337–360. 
Fernandez, Jose L., and Javier Camacho. 2016. “Effective Elements to Establish an Ethical 
Infrastructure: An Exploratory Study of SME´s in the Madrid Region.” Journal of 
Business Ethics 138 (1): 113–131. 
Fleming, Jenny, and Ian Holland. 2000. “Motivating Ethical Conduct in Government 
Ministers.” International Institute for Public Ethics Conference, Ottawa, September 2000. 
Hartmann, Martin. 2020. Vertrauen. Berlin: S. Fischer. 
Hesse, Joachim, Christopher Hood, and B. Guy Peter. (Eds.) 2003. Paradoxes in Public 
Sector Reform: An International Comparison. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. 
Hoekstra, Alain. 2015. Institutionalizing Integrity Management: Challenges and Solutions 
in Times of Financial Crises and Austerity measures. In Lawton, A., van der Wal, Z. 
Huberts, L. (Eds.), Ethics in Public Policy and Management (pp. 151–169). London: 
Routledge. 
Hoekstra, A./Huberts, L./von Montfort, A./Maesschalck, J. & Demmke, C. 2021. Lokale 
Integriteitssystemen in Nederland, Duitsland en Vlaanderen, University of Amsterdam. 
Amsterdam. 
Hoekstra, A./Zweegers, M. 2021., Integriteitsmanagement en de integriteitsmanager, 
Huis voor Klokkenluiders, Den Haag.  
Huberts, Leo, Frank Anechiarico, and Frederique Six. (Eds.) 2008. Local Integrity 
Systems: World Cities Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity. BJU.   
Huberts, Leo, and Frederique Six. 2012. “Local Integrity Systems: Towards a Framework 
for Comparative Analysis and Assessment.” Public Integrity 14 (2): 151–172. 
Johnson, M. & Fritzen, S. 2021.The Conundrum of Corruption, Routledge. 
Kaptein, Muel. 1998. Ethics Management. Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer. 
Kerkhoff, T./Overeem, P.2021. The Fluidity of Integrity: Lessons from Dutch Scandals, 
Public Integrity, No. 23, pp. 82-94. 
Kirby, Nicholas. 2020 (forthcoming). “An Institution-First Conception of Public 
Integrity.” British Journal of Political Science. 
Kühl, S., 2020. Brauchbare Illegalität, Vom Nutzen de Regelbruchs in Organisationen, 
Campus: Frankfurt/Main. 
Lamboo, Terry, Wouter van Dooren and Paul Heywood 2015. Prime Witnesses? Case 
Studies of staff Assessments for Monitoring Integrity in European Union. Netherlands 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Kingdom Relations. 
Lapuente, Victor, and Steven Van de Walle. 2020. ”The Effects of New Public Management 
on the Quality of Public Services.” Governance 33 (3): 461–475. 
University of Vaasa Reports     37 
Lascoumes, Pierre. 2014. “Condemning Corruption and Tolerating Conflicts of Interest: 
French Arrangements Regarding Breaches of Integrity.” In Auby, J., Breen, E. & Perroud, 
T. (Eds.), Corruption and Conflicts of Interest (pp. 83–84). Cheltenham: Edgar Elgar.  
Lukes, Steven. 2008. Moral Relativism. London: Picador. 
Mackenzie, G. S. 2002. Scandal Proof: Do Ethics Laws Make Government Better? 
Brookings Institution. 
Maesschalck, Jeroen, and Janos Bertok. 2008. Towards a Sound Integrity Framework: 
Instruments, Processes, Structures and Conditions for Implementation. OECD. 
Martin, Sean, Jennifer J. Kish-Gephart, and James R. Detert. 2014. ”Blind Forces: Ethical 
Infrastructures and Moral Disengagement in Organizations.” Organizational Psychology 
Review 4 (4): 295–325. 
Mazur, Stanislaw. (Ed). 2020. Public Administration in Central Europe. London: 
Routledge.  
Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina. 2020. “The Rise and Fall of Good Governance Promotion.” Journal 
of Democracy 31: 88–102.  
Neuhäuser, C.,/Seidel, C. (eds) (2020). Kritik des Moralismus. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp.  
OECD. 2003. Recommendation of the Council on Guidelines for Managing Conflict of 
Interest in the Public Service. June. OECD.  
OECD. 2020. Public Integrity Handbook. OECD.  
Peters, Anne, and Lukas Handschin. (Eds.). 2012. Conflict of Interest in Global, Public and 
Private Governance. Cambridge University Press.  
Peterson, John. 2016. “Juncker’s Political European Commission and an EU in Crisis.” 
Journal of Common Market Studies: 55 (2), 349–367.  
Pollitt, Christopher, and Geert Bouckaert. 2011. Public Management Reform: A 
Comparative Analysis, 2nd Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Pope, Jeremy. 1996. National integrity systems. Transparency International.  
Polowcyk, Pawel. 2017. “Organizational Ethical Integrity: Good and Bad Illusions.” 
Palgrave Communications 3: 46.  
Rodwin, Marc. 2018. “Attempts to Redefine Conflicts of Interest.” Accountability in 
Research 25 (2): 67–78.  
Rosenson, Beth. 2006. “The Impact of Ethics Laws on Legislative Recruitment and the 
Occupational Composition of State Legislatures.” Political Research Quarterly 59 (4): 
619–627. 
Saint-Martin, Denis, and Fred Thompson. (Eds.) 2006. Public Ethics and Governance: 
Standards and Practices in Comparative Perspective. Amsterdam: Elsevier.  
University of Vaasa Reports     38 
Schminke, Marshall. 1998. Managerial Ethics: Moral Management of People and 
Processes. New York: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Schwartz, Michael, Howard Harris, and Debra Comer. (Eds.). 2015. The Ethical 
Contribution of Organizations to Society. Bingley: Emerald. 
Stark, Andrew. 2000. Conflict of Interest in American Life. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press.  
Trevino, Linda. 1986. “Ethical Decision Making in Organizations: A Person-Situation 
Interactionist Model.” The Academy of Management Review 11 (3): 601–617.  
Tosi, J., and Warmke, B. (2020). Grandstanding: The Use and Abuse of Moral Talk. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press van den Berg, Caspar. 2017. ”Dynamics in the Dutch 
Policy Advisory System: Externalization, Politicization and the Legacy of Pillarization.” 
Journal of Policy Sciences 50 (1): 63–84. 
Walzer, Michael. 1973. “The Problem of Dirty Hands.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 2 (2): 
160–180. 
de Wijze, Stephen. 2013. “Punishing ‘Dirty Hands’: Three Justifications.” Ethical Theory 
and Moral Practice 16: 879–897.  
Williams, Bernard. 1978. “Politics and Moral Character.” In Hampshire, S. (Ed.), Public 
and Private Morality (pp. 55-74). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
